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Closing
The Classroom Door
On Civil Rights
26

In its zeal to stop
school busing, the
Reagan administration
has effectively
closed the classroom
door on civil rights
enforcement
by Neal Devins

William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights, is
convinced that the civil rights community is out to get him. He prefaced
a Justice Department report defending the Department's civil rights enforcement record with the comment:
"All too often sensational charges of
'retreat' and 'roll back' purporting to
be 'well-documented' attract instant
media attention, while a responsible
reply which exposes the falseness of
the original charges receives no
coverage. In this instance, we believe
that the public has a 'right to know'
the facts, rather than be left with false
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impressions created by press reliance
on continued misstatement." (Correcting the Record of Civil Rights
Enforcement, January 20, 1981 to September 30, 1982; A Response to the
Report of the Washington Council of
Lawyers. November, 1982 [hereinafter cited as Washington Council
Response].)
Mr. Reynolds has claimed, that the
Civil Rights Division is acting in a responsible manner. Yet, over the past
three years, stern criticism has been
levied against the division by many
civil rights groups. Most noticeable,
three "in-depth" reports have been

issued by the civil rights proponents
criticizing almost every action taken
by the CRD. [See Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Without Justice:
A Report on the Conduct of the Justice
Department in Civil Rights in 1981-82,
February 1982 [hereinafter referred to
as Leadership Conference]; Washington Council on Lawyers, Reagan Civil
Rights: The First Twenty Months, September 1982 [hereinafter referred to
as Washington Council]; American
Civil Liberties Union, Civil Liberties in
Reagan's America, October 1982
[hereinafter referred to as ACLU].) Additionally, the U.S. Commission on
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Civil Rights, as well as the more specialized civil rights interest groups,
have criticized nearly all CRD policy
initiatives.
The overwhelmingly negative response by civil rights interests to Mr.
Reynolds' CRD is not at all surprising.
As Chester Finn noted, "Ronald
Reagan assumed office after a decade and a half in which the presidency (particularly the Carter
Administration) had vigorously
sought to advance group interests
through regulation, judicial interpretation, and government expenditure, and in which policy conflicts
between group interests and individual rights, on the one hand, and
between group interests evenhanded national standards on the
other, were almost always resolved
in favor of the interested groups."
(Finn," 'Affirmative Action' Under
Reagan," p.20, Commentary, April
1982.) Thus, civil rights interests had
come to expect that a sympathetic
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executive branch would assist them
in achieving their policy objectives.
President Reagan did not offer such
sympathy. The 1980 GOP platform
stated that: "[E]qual opportunity
should not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions
which rely on quotas, ratios, and
numerical requirements to exclude
some individuals in favor of others,
thereby rendering such regulations
and decisions inherently discriminatory."
Since the policy objectives of the
Reagan administration represented a
retrenchment from previous "victories" for the cause of civil rights, civil
rights proponents felt compelled to
criticize the new administration merely to stay its ground. Despite this, the
criticisms levied against the Reagan
Administration have been especially
strong. The American Civil Liberties
Union contended that "for this administration, the erosion of the Bill of
Rights seems to be a primary goal, not
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a side effect. This administration
seeks to make structural changes
in our system of government that,
should they succeed, will not be easy
to overcome once their time in office
passes." (ACLU, p.2.) Along the same
lines, the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights noted in its report criticizing CRD: "[O]ne thing has become
painfully clear. At the Justice Department in 1982, basic qualities of fairmindedness and fidelity to the law
are lacking. Instead, power and prejudice hold sway." (Leadership Conference, p.75.) The National Urban
League opened the 1982 edition of its
annual report on "The State of Black
America" with a similar commentary:
"At no point in recent memory had
the distance between the national
government and black America been
greater than it was in 1981, nor had
the relationship between the two
been more strained."
What is it about CRD policies that
have caused such an extreme outcry?

The Leadership Conference claimed
that CRD had:
• repudiated the Supreme Court's
definitive interpretation of the
Constitution and laws and announced that it would refuse to
enforce the law of the land;
• abruptly switched sides in cases
pending before the Supreme
Court and announced that it
would seek the overturning of
Supreme Court decisions of very
recent vintage, in dis regard of the
importance of certainty and continuity in the law;
• sought to undermine confidence
in the judiciary by launching a
sweeping attack on the federal
courts for performing their constitutional role of protecting the
rights of minorities from intrusions of majority will;
• established itself as the locus of
anti-civil rights activity in the
federal government, reaching into other agencies to try to curb
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policies deemed overly protective of civil rights;
• cooperated in the corruption of
the legal process by allowing its
decisions to be shaped by appeals from politicians not based
on law.
Specifically, CRD critics allege: (1) In
Fair Housing Law Enforcement, "The
Division has abandoned entirely filing suits against discriminatory zoning ordinances. Its attorneys have not
been permitted to review the 'effects'
of housing policy as well as the motivation for it, although the effects test
is the prevailing law of the land."
(Washington Council, p.2.) (2) On the
voting rights issues, CRD is alleged to
have refused to pursue new cases and
reversed litigation positions established during previous administrations. (Washington Council, p.3.)(3) In
the field of equal employment opportunity, "The Division has flatly repudiated the well-established require(P/ease turn to page 44)

closing the classroom door
ment that affirmative action may be
necessary to remedy certain types of
employment discrimination, announcing that under no circumstances
would it impose such relief regardless
of the particular case." (Washington
Council, p.6.) (4) In criminal court
rights prosecutions, CRD critics note
that "although the level of racially
motivated violence appears to be on
the increase, the Division's capacity
for prosecuting these cases does not
show a proportionate increase."
(Washington Council, p.S.)

CRD policies in equal education
opportunity have been the most
severely criticized. Great emphasis
has been place on CRD's failure to initiate desegregation lawsuits. (Washington Council, p.2.) CRD also refuses
to pursue busing remedies in desegregation lawsuits. (Leadership Conference, p.11.) CRD similarly refuses to
make use of the presumption that
proof of intentional segregation in a
"significant" portion of a school dis-

(Continued from page 29)

trict suggests that there was intentional segregation in other racially
imbalanced portions of the district.
(Washington Council, p. 29-30.) In
higher education cases, CRD has entered into settlements which allegedly violate standards established by
the Department of Education. (leadership Conference, p.28.) CRD supposedly "has also assisted in a concerted effort to deprive the federal
courts of their discretion to employ
busing as a remedial device where
appropriate (by contending that Congress can severely restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts to order busing)." (Washington Council, p.43-44.)
Finally, CRD provided "the impetus
for the Reagan Administration in
its attempt to grant tax exemptions
to racially discriminatory private
schools." (Leadership Conference,
p.16.)
The sheer volume of criticism
levied against CRD makes most difficult the chore of deciphering valid
from invalid criticism. This essay con-
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sequently will pursue the more
modest aim of providing a critical review of the CRD legal analyses affecting the "race and schooling"
issue for elementary and secondary
education. Three subjects will be examined: forced busing and scope of
relief in desegregation lawsuits, Congress' ability to limit court desegregation orders, and the tax-exempt status
of racially discriminatory private
schools. Although my analysis suggests that CRD policy is in grave error
on the "race and schooling" issue,
this conclusion does not necessarily
suggest that all CRD policies are off
base.
The question of "race and schooling" has traditionally been the centerpiece of America's civil rights movement. As David Kirp noted, Brown v.
Board of Education symbolized the
universalistic vision that: "Once racial barriers were lifted, it was supposed, there would exist neither
white schools nor black schools, but
'just schools.' When the dual system
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was dismantled, the constitutional
rights of blacks would be secured; so
too would their opportunity for social
and economic equality. Blacks,like
whites, would then be free to succeed
or fail on the basis of merit, not
caste." (D. Kirp, just Schools, (1982).)
This universalistic vision has not seen
fruition, however. The Supreme
Court consequently has rejected the
use of "freedom-of-choice" plans
which permit white and black students to choose, whether they would
prefer to go to the previously allblack high school or the previously
all-white high school. (See, e.g., Green
v. County School Board of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).)
In place of such voluntary remedies, the Supreme Court has found
permissible remedies which require
the rearrangement of attendance
zones and mandatory pupil transportation. (See, e.g., Swann v. CharlotteMeckenburg County Board of Education, 402 U.S.1 (1971).)The Supreme
Court, has also established an important presumption that proof of intentional segregation in a significant
portion of a school district infers that
there was intentional segregation in
other racially imbalanced portions of
the district. (See, Keyes v. (Denver)
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973).) This presumption was based
on the Court's recognition of the difficulty of proving intentional segregation in Northern and Western school
systems where segregation had not
been mandated by state laws.
The Department of Justice (DO)) is
the primary law enforcer in the field
of school desegregation. DOJ may
presently initiate or intervene in
school desegregation lawsuits under
federal statutes that prohibit racial
discrimination by educational institutions at the state or local level. DOJ
has advocated the civil rights position before the Supreme Court in
those cases which rejected voluntary
freedom of choice plans, recognized
that mandatory busing can be an appropriate remedy, and established
the common-sense presumption that
intentional segregation in one portion of a school district infers intentional segregation in other racially
imbalanced portions of that district.
The Reagan Justice Department
has rejected both mandatory busing
as an appropriate remedy and the use

of the Keyes presumption to establish
liability in desegregation lawsuits.
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds
expressed concern that mandatory
pupil transportation remedies per se
"are threatening to dilute the essential (national) consensus that racial
discrimination is wrong and should
not be tolerated in any form."
(Speech before the Delaware Bar Association, p.9, February 1982.) He added:
The flight from urban public
schools has eroded the tax base
of many cities, which has in turn
contributed to the growing inability of many school systems to
provide high-quality education
to their students-whether
black or white. Similarly, the
loss of parental support and involvement has robbed many
public school systems of a critical component of successful educational programs. When one
adds to these realities the growing empirical evidence that racially balanced public schools
have failed to improve the educational achievement of the students, the case for mandatory
busing collapses.
Instead of mandatory pupil transportation, CRD now advances a remedial
strategy program which includes
"[t]he voluntary student assignment
program, magnet schools, and enhanced curriculum requirements,
faculty incentives, in-service training
programs for teachers and administrators, school closings, if you have
excess capacity, or new construction
where that may be called for."
(School Desegregation, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the judiciary, House of Representatives, Nov. 1981, p.631.)
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds alleges that the CRD position is
consistent with Supreme Court precedents. First, in regard to the Court's rejection of an ineffective "freedom-ofchoice" plan, Mr. Reynolds contends
that "the Court held simply that the
Constitution requires racially nondiscriminatory student assignments
and eradication of the segregative
effects of past intentional racial
discrimination by school officials."
(Testimony of William Bradford
Reynolds, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on
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the Judiciary, United States Senate,
October 1981, p.6.) Second, Mr. Reynolds argues that when the Supreme
Court ~pproved the use of busing "[it]
spoke m measured terms, expressing
reserved acceptance of busing as but
one of a number of remedial devices
available for use when ... it is 'practicable,' 'reasonable,' 'feasible,'
'workable,' and 'realistic.' The Court
clearly did not contemplate indiscriminate use of busing without
regard to other important, and often
conflicting considerations." (ld at 7).
Third, CRD "concluded that involuntary busing has largely failed in two
major respects: (1) it has failed to elicit public support and (2) it has failed
to advance the overriding goal of
equal education opportunity. Adherence to an experiment that has not
withstood the test of experience obviously makes little sense." (ld at 11.)
Social science research and established constitutional doctrine generally refute the CRD position. First,
academic gains appear to outweigh
academic losses. (See, e.g., Hawley,
"The New Mythology of School Desegregation," 42 Law and Contemporary Problems 214 (Spring 1978).)
Second, and more significant, the
constitutional infirmity which desegregation remedies address is racial
isolation in the public schools, not
disparities in academic achievement
between blacks and whites. Thus, the
focus of the initial remedy in a desegregation case should be to address
the problem of racial imbalance in
the public schools. Social science evidence clearly demonstrates that
mandatory pupil transportation remedies are more effective than voluntary remedies in addressing the problem of racial isolation in the public
schools. (See, e.g., M. Smylie, Reducing Racial Isolations in LargeSchool
Districts: The Comparative Efficiency
of Mandatory and Voluntary Desegregation Strategies (1982).)
CRD's legal analysis is also faulty
both because it ignores germane portions of the cases that it reviews and
because it ignores recent Supreme
Court decisions pertinent to the busing issue. The Supreme Court, in approving the use of mandatory pupil
reassignments, recognized that in
order to eliminate all vestiges of an
unconstitutional dual school system,
desegregation remedies may be "administratively awkward, inconve-

nient, and even bizarre." (Swann v.
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28
(1971 ).) Thus, even if Mr. Reynolds is
correct that busing "has failed to
elicit public support," the constitutional question is whether busing effectively addresses the problem of
racial isolation in the public schools.
CRD also ignores recent Supreme
Court decisions speaking to the contined efficacy of mandatory busing.
University of Chicago law professor
Edmund Kitch summarizes these decisions as follows: "The Court endorses an approach to the 'factual'
question that makes proof of a neighborhood school policy into proof of
racial discrimination. It then approves a remedy which, by implication, assumes that a neighborhood
school policy, when combined with
any significant residential segregation, is unconstitutional." (Kitch,
"The Return of Color-Consciousness
to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton,
and Columbus," 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev.
1,6 (1980).)
This view, thatthe Court views busing as a constitutionally mandated
remedy, has also surfaced in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
the Dallas (1980) and Nashville (1983)
desegregation lawsuits. In Dallas, the
Court refused to review the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturning of
a District Court order which substituted educational remedies and
neighborhood schools for systemwide busing based on black-white
student population ratios. (Estes v.
Metropolitan Branches of Dallas
NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980).) Ironically, CRD had sought to buttress its
argument that busing is improper by
quoting Justice Powell's dissent to
the Court's denial of certiorari in that
case. (See, e.g., Reynolds, Oct. 1981
testimony, p.9; Reynolds, Nov. 1981
testimony, p. 9-10.) The Supreme
Court, in the Nashville case, similarly
refused to review an appellate court
decision holding that a district court
could not substitute educational
remedies for mandatory busing, despite the District Court's finding that
busing has proven ineffective in that
school system. (Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education, 103 S.
Ct. 834 (1983).) The Justice Department intervened in Nashville claiming that "[Supreme Court decisions
do] not mandate the use of any partie-

46

ular remedial device [e.g., busing] but
instead indicate in general terms
which devices are permissible and
whatthe limits on their use might be."
(Kelley, Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, p.10.) This contention, however,
was inapposite to the legal issue
raised in Nashville. Nashville did not
call into question the propriety of
judicially mandated busing orders.
Instead, Nashville raised the issue of
what legal significance ought to be
attributed to the long-term efforts of
school boards trying to implement
mandatory pupil transportation
orders. CRD thus tried to use this case
as a political vehicle to further the
Reagan administration's anti-busing
policies. (See Devins, "New Dilemmas and Opportunities in Integrating
Schools," Education Week, Mar. 9,
1983, p. 24.)
CRD, in addition to its refusal to
pursue busing remedies, "will not
make use of the Keyes presumption
(that intentional segregation in one
part of a school system suggests intentional segregation in other parts),
but will define the violation precisely
and seek to limit the remedy only to
those schools in which racial imbalance is the product of intentionally
segregative acts of state officials."
(Reynolds, Oct. 1981 testimony, p.
12.) The Supreme Court had devised
this presumption because it felt that
"common sense dictates the conclusion that racially inspired school
board actions have an impact beyond
the particular schools that are the
subject of those actions." (Keyes, 413
189, 202 (1973).)
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds offered the following rationale
for CRD's refusal to use Keyes in its
decision to initiate litigation: "To
avoid imposition of a system-wide
desegregation plan, which often includes system-wide busing, a school
board subject to the Keyes presumption must shoulder the difficult burden of proving that racial imbalance
in schools elsewhere in the system is
not attributable to school authorities .... [The Keyes presumption has
been used] in some instances in imposition of system-wide transportation remedies encompassing not only
de jure, or state imposed, racial segregation, but de facto racial segregation
as well." (Reynolds, Nov. 1981 testimony, p.11-12 (emphasis supplied).)

u.s.
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The pol icy imp! ications of the CRD
approach were noted in the Washi,ngton Council Report:
This shift in policy has more
than theoretical importance. By
seeking relief in only part of a
school system where segregation has occurred, the Division
will encourage residential instability and "white flight" as
parents seek to transfer their
children to schools unaffected
by desegregation. In addition,
meaningful desegregation may
often be impossible if only a
fraction of a school district is involved. The Division's new policy, therefore, can only lead to
the very unstable and ineffective attempts to desegregation
which the Division's own leadership has decried. (Washington
Council, p. 48.)
The CRD policy is also unsavory
because it seeks to minimize the
remedial duties of school districts
already found guilty of significant
acts of intentional segregation. The
Keyes presumption is only triggered if
there is intentional segregration in a
significant portion of a school
district. Thus in its effort to avoid "unfair application of the Keyes
presumption," CRD is willing to err on
the side of those school districts
found guilty of intentional segregation.
CRD's policy is also inconsistent
with the Supreme Courts view on this
issue. Over the past five years, Court
desegregation decisions evidence a
view on the part of the Justices that,
absent intentional government segregation, ours would be a naturally integrated world. Under this approach,
it is proper to make a finding of a system-wide violation in a racially imbalanced school system guilty of intentional segregation in significant
portions of the system. CRD's view of
granting relief based solely on the incremental effects of proven discrimination suggests that ours might be a
naturally segregated world. Justices
Rehnquist and Powell support this interpretation of the law.
CRD has sought to limit criticism
on the Keyes presumption issue,
claiming that "the Assistant Attorney
General was extremely careful to
make clear that his use of the Keyes
presumption would be limited ... to
the litigation stages of a school case,

and would not be used as an investigatory tool to avoid ferreting out the
real facts about alleged segregative
practices, procedures and attitudes
of school authorities." (Washington
Council Response, p.13 n9.) This
remark is a nonsequitur, however. If
CRD is unwilling to make use of the
Keyes presumption in its decision to
initiate a lawsuit, because of possible
"unfair" consequences, CRD clearly
will not seek system-wide relief
unless there is proven intentional
segregation throughout the system.
This is evidenced by CRD's failure to
"initiate" any new desegregation lawsuits. Ultimately, CRD's rhetoric
about the inequities of the Keyes
presumption seem little more than a
smokescreen for Department hostility towards expansive desegregation
remedies, particularly busing.
CRD's hostility to the busing remedy and the Keyes presumption will
impede the advancement of the goals
of desegregation as established by
the Supreme Court. Worse than this,
CRD policies may spur on future
school district inadventure. Witness
the following colloquy between
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds
and the counsel for the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights:
Counsel: Are you suggesting
that if a community intentionally chooses sites for its schools
that create a segregated system,
and those schools are built,
there should be no remedy that
actually desegregates these
facilities other than on a voluntary basis?
Mr. Reynolds: I think using those
[voluntary] desegregation techniques that I mentioned to you, I
would say that would be the proper way to address the problem.
I think that every kid in America
has a right to an integrated
education where he wants it,
especially if you have a situation
(of intentional segregation).
(Testimony , Nov. 1981, p. 632)
(emphasis supplied).

CRD's hostility towards the busing
remedy is also reflected by the Division's response to congressional efforts to limit both federal court jurisdiction in desegregation suits and
CRD authority to pursue the busing
remedy. The Senate, in September
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Social science evidence
clearly demonstrates
that mandatory pupil
transportation remedies
are more effective than
voluntary remedies in
correcting the problem
of racial isolation in
public schools
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1981, passed the so-called Helms
Amendment which (1) forbids "the
Department of Justice to bring or
maintain any sort of action to require
directly or indirectly the transportation of any student to a school other
than the school which is nearest the
student's home," (Helms Amendment No. 69,127 Cong. Rec. 56274
(daily ed. 6/16/81 ).) and (2) forbids any
federal court to "order or issue any
writ ordering directly or indirectly
any student to be assigned or to be
transported to a public school [more
than 10 miles or 15 minutes away
from that school] ... which is nearest
to the student's residence." (127
Cong. Rec. S 6644-45 (daily ed.
6/22/81).) On May 6, 1982, Attorney
General William French Smith announced that the Department of Justice concluded that the court-curbing
bill was constitutional. (Letter from
William French Smith to Peter W.
Rodino, Chairman of Committee on
the Judiciary, House of Representatives.) On July 22, 1982, Theodore
Olson, Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel, testified
before a House Subcommittee in favor of the constitutionality of the prohibition of CRD efforts to pursue busing remedies. (Testimony of Theodore B. Olson.)
Attorney General Smith's conclusion that Congress was empowered to
limit court desegregation remedies
were premised on two dubious presumptions.
First, the Attorney General ruled
that "[t]he substantial weight of the
text and legislative history supports
the proposition that the bill limits the
remedial power of the federal courts,
not the Supreme Court." (Letter, p. 5.)
This conclusion is of great significance since "a Supreme Court with
authority to review and revise lower
and state court judgments may be
constitutionally necessary to assure
the national uniformity and supremacy of the Constitution and federal
law." (Dale, Legal Analysis Regarding
the Transportation of Students, p. 42;
see also Radner, "Congressional
Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt,"109 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 151,160-67 (1960); Hart, "The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic," 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362
(1953).) The Attorney General based
this reading primarily on the fact that

the bill recited Article ! II Section 1 of
the Constitution as Congress' source
of power for enacting the measure.
Section 1 of Article Ill provides
authority for limiting the jurisdiction
and the powers of the inferior federal
courts, not the Supreme Court. Yet,
Justice Department officials later
noted: "We have observed in the
legislative history certain ambiguous
statements upon which an argument
might be based that a restriction on
the powers of the Supreme Court may
have been intended."
Finally,
Senator Johnson (a co-sponsor of the
measure) has stated subsequent to
the passage by the Senate of S. 951
that he fully intended its provisions to
apply equally to the inferior federal
courts and the Supreme Court. Considering this discrepancy between the
Attorney General's reading of the bill
and that of bill sponsor Johnson, it
may well be that the Attorney
General opted for his reading of the
bill in order to duck the constitutional
issue and thereby encourage congressional passage of such jurisdictionlimiting measures.
The Attorney General also argued
"that the time and distance limitations contained in ... the bill would
serve as legislative benchmarks for
federal and state courts in the future
in devising appropriate decrees ....
This limited effect on the court's remedial power does not convert the judicial power-to hear and decide
particular cases without any power to
issue relief affecting individual legal
rights or obligations in specific
courts." (Letter, p. 10, p.12.) The accuracy of this statement, however, is
contingent on the accuracy of the Attorney General's view that student
transportation is never a necessary
feature of a remedial desegregation
decree. If a court views as necessary
mandatory transportation remedies
extending beyond Congress' proposed time-distance limitations, congressional action might foreclose
court remedial power. Considering
that racial isolation is the wrong addressed in desegregation orders and
that mandatory remedies are more
effective than voluntary ones, it
would seem that the Attorney General is wrong when he speaks of "[t]his
I im ited effect on the court's remedial
power."
The Helms Amendment would
have also prohibited the Department
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of Justice from bringing or maintaining any action which might require
the busing of school children. Attorney General Smith concluded that
this action "would be constitutional
if read to preserve the government's
ability to fulfill its Fifth Amendment
obligations by initiating anti-discrimination suits, restricting only, and in a
very limited fashion, the Department's participation, by seeking a
busing order, in the remedial phase of
such suits." (Letter, p. 14; emphasis
supplied; see also Testimony of
Theodore Olson p. 32-44.) This analysis, like the analysis of the jurisdiction
limiting provision, assumes that busing is a non-essential remedy. Otherwise, DOJ authority would be restricted significantly, not "in a very
limited fashion." Yet, as Charles Dale
of the Congressional Research Service noted: "[T]he effect of [this
restriction], when read together with
restrictions placed ... [on the Department of Education through other appropriations measures], might be to
place the federal government in the
position of continuing to fund unconstitutionally segregated school systems. This is because DOJ would be
precluded from seeking judicial enforcement in cases referred to it by
[the Department of Education] under
Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964] where student transportation
may be the last effective desegregation remedy." (Dale, Legal Analysis
Regarding the Enforcement Authority
of the Department of Justice, August
1981, p. 9; emphasis supplied.) Again,
the legal conclusions of the Reagan
Justice Department seem more in
line with administration policies than
legal realities.
One more area where CRD has antagonized civil rights proponents on
the "race and education" issue of elementary and secondary school students is the controversy surrounding
the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools. On January 8,1982, the Treasury Department
announced that "without further
guidance from Congress, the Internal
Revenue Service will no longer revoke or deny tax-exempt status [to] ...
organizations on the ground that they
don't conform with fundamental
public policies [such as racial nondismination]." (IRS News Release,
Jan. 8, 1982.) Also, on that day, DOL
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in light of the Treasury announcement, sought to vacate as moot two
cases before the Supreme Court, Bob
jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools (Memorandum for the
United States; Jan. 8, 1982). Both
cases involved federal appellate
court rulings upholding as legally correct the IRS's denial of tax-exempt
status to schools whose admitted
racial discrimination was based on
religious belief.
The IRS had established its policy
of racial nondiscrimination in 1970
following a D.C. District Court decision, Green v. Kennedy, which temporarily enjoined the Service from
granting tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory schools in Mississippi.
(309 F. Supp.1127 (D.D.C. 1970).) The
IRS based this decision on a finding
that it would be improper to grant taxexemptions to schools that violate
important public policy objectives
established in Brown v. Board of Education and in the Civil Rights Act of
1964. (IRS News Release; July 10,
1970.) The Supreme Court ultimately
affirmed the Green decision. (404 U.S.
997 (1971).) Yet, in a subsequent decision, the Court noted: "[T]he court's
affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case involving a
truly adversary controversy." (Bob
jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725, 740 n11 (1974).)
CRD seized upon the inconclusiveness of the Green affirmance in justifying the administration's policy reversal on this matter. CRD argued
that it was improper for the IRS to
read a public policy requirement into
the plain language of the congressionally enacted tax-exemption
provision of the Internal Revenue
Code. Yet, after severe public criticism of the new position and congressional refusal to enact a racial
nondiscrimination requirement, CRD
returned to the Supreme Court where
it requested that the case be decided.
In order to provide some semblance
of a case or controversy within the
Court's jurisdiction, the government
suggested that the Court appoint
"counsel adversary" to the school on
the underlying issue of whether the
IRS is statutorily required to either
grant or deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools.
The Court abided by this unorthodox
administration request and appointed William J. Coleman, Jr., to ar-

gue the "government's side" in these
cases (50 U.S.L.W. 3837 (Apr. 19,
1982).) On May 24, 1983, the Supreme
Court upheld the pre-Reagan IRS position that racially discriminatory
schools were not entitled to taxexempt status. (Bob jones University
v. United States, 43 CCH S. Ct. Bull,
2669 (1983).)
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds explained that CRD felt compelled to reinstate the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private
schools since "(i]t is the province and
duty of the Justice Department, as
the responsible advocate of the Executive Branch, to advance in court its
best view of what the law says and
means. This we have done, and will
continue to do." (The Civil Rights Policy of the Department of justice: A
Response to the Report of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, April
1982, p. 20.) Yet, without commenting
on the accuracy or inaccuracy of
CRD's legal position, CRD's actions
on this matter were in grave error for
at least three reasons. First, there was
no need for CRD to act. The Supreme
Court was already set to resolve the
statutory interpretation issue raised
by CRD in Bob Jones University. And
even if CRD leadership did not agree
with the government's position in
these cases, those attorneys who had
been responsible for this case (and
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prevailed before the Fourth Circuit)
certainly would have zealously
argued the government's position
against vigorous opposition from Bob
Jones University's counsel. Thus, if
CRD had done nothing, the Court
would have resolved the statutory
issue in the form of a proper adversarial contest. Apparently, CRD
wanted to avoid a Court decision
upholding the racial nondiscrimination policy.
CRD was also in error because prior dissatisfaction with congressional
action on this issue clearly suggested
that Congress favored the racial
nondiscrimination requirement. The
clear federal pol icy against
discriminatory institutions is firmly
established in several Supreme Court
decisions and many congressional
enactments. Congress' reaction to
the D.C. District Court decision
McG/otten v. Connally illustrates its
opposition to granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory institutions. (338 F. Supp. 448(DDC 1972))
In McCiotten, the court held that
nonprofit private clubs that excluded
non-whites from membership were
entitled to tax-exempt status. Congress expressed its dissatisfaction
with McGiotten by amending the taxexemption provision of the Internal
Revenue Code to prohibit the granting of tax exemptions to racially
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discriminatory private clubs. (26
U.S.C. sect. 501(c)(1976).) The Senate
Committee Report on this legislation
states that "it is believed that it is inappropriate for a social club ... to be
exempt from income taxation if its
written policy is to discriminate on
account of race, color, or religion."($.
Rep. No.1318, 94thCong., 2d Sess. 8.)
CRD can also be criticized for its
decision to ask the Supreme Court to
hear Bob Jones University subsequent to its efforts to have the case
declared moot. Since government
and the university agreed on the
case's underlying issue, the Court's
hearing of the case thus abandoned
the fundamental requirement of
federal judicial proceedings that the
parties who bring a case to court
should be the ones whose interests
will be represented before the court.
The Supreme Court's decision to resolve this case was a political one of
the type, ironically, that the Reagan
administration has rebuked courts
for making. According to Attorney
General Smith, "Responsibility for
pol icy making in a democratic repub-
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lie must reside in those who are directly accountable to the electorate ... Courts are limited by Article Ill
to deciding live disputes presented to
them by parties with a concrete and
particularized interest in the outcome." (Smith, "Urging judicial Restraint. 68 ABA j. 59, 60 (1982).) The
administration's handling of this matter thus suggests that its policy of
judicial restraint is a smoke screen for
the attainment of political ends. Reflective of this are CRD policies I imiting certain aspects of school desegregation litigation and CRD recognition
of congressional authority over both
court jurisdiction in fashioning desegregation remedies and DOJ enforcement of court-approved desegregation remedies.
On the tax exemption issue, Chester Finn aptly noted:
This was no case of group entitlements, of government-mandated equality of result, or of requiring preferential treatment
for those previously disadvantaged by their sex or color. It was
purely and simply a matter of
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old-fashioned racism and of
what the government's policy
ought to be toward those few
schools that openly deny admission to black youngsters on account of their color. It signalled
that perhaps the administration
is not really color-blind. (Finn,
"'Affirmative Action Under Reagan," Commentary, April 1982,
p. 26.)
Whether such bad motives can be attributed to other CRD policies on the
"race and education" issue or the
more general question of civil rights
enforcement is more difficult to
gauge. Clearly, CRD positions represent a retrenchment from past administrations' support for the "civil
rights" side of these issues. And in the
matter of racial equality for elementary and secondary school children,
CRD seems more concerned with advancing its anti-busing policies than
with the law. In the "race and education" issue, CRD policies seem contrary to the principle of equality
under the law.
hr

